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Abstract 
There is a controversial debate on how the transition towards electricity generation from re-
newable energy sources (RES-E) affects European electricity markets in terms of prices and 
market efficiency. This thesis contributes to this debate by providing the first panel economet-
ric analysis of how both different sources of electricity generation and electricity market poli-
cies impact on the household price of electricity. Based on a sample of 29 European countries 
(EU-27 and two more), it finds that electricity production from combustible sources, natural 
gas, hydro and wind for the time span of 1991-2007 had a significant price lowering effect 
(ceteris paribus, on average). In contrast to that, results for the time span of 2004-2007 suggest 
that RES-E had a price increasing effect which can be related to its rapid growth in the 2000s. 
Results also suggest that Feed-in-Tariffs, regulatory reforms and the European emission trad-
ing scheme play an important role, but their impact depends on country specific characteris-
tics. The latter seem to be an important factor in determining the level of prices. 
I) Introduction 
Energy policy in Europe and in the European Union (EU) in particular has been dominated in 
recent years by the transition of the energy economy away from fossil and towards renewable 
sources of electricity generation. In that regard, the EU aims at the achievement of two major 
goals: A substantial reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly CO2 and an 
increase in electricity generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E) that is done in a 
cost-efficient way (de Miera, et al., 2008). Apart from that, more RES-E promises energy 
security meaning less exposure to volatile energy imports that are associated with (geo-) polit-
ical risk. The main instruments to achieve those goals are support policies for RES-E promo-
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tion and the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). Whereas the latter was implemented at the 
EU level in 2005, support policies are applied at the national level.  
While in 2010 RES-E contributed for around 20% of electricity consumption, it is expected to 
be between 33 and 40% for 2020 (EREC, 2011). Critics have highlighted the potentially 
enormous cost of such a rapid transition leading to inefficiencies and a rise of electricity prices 
putting a high burden especially on electricity consumers. This relates to the fact that most 
RES-E, except for hydroelectric energy, are young technologies that may be excessively cost-
ly, also due to their stage of development, compared to established sources of energy. How-
ever, there are a multitude of other factors that can determine electricity market efficiency to a 
high degree, potentially far outweighing these impacts of the deployment of RES-E. Whereas 
policy interventions such as subsidies may lead to market distortions, the ETS may increase 
efficiency through internalization. Market conditions such as the degree of competition or 
country specific factors also play a role.  
In recent years, major reforms have been made in this area. This raises the question of how 
these changes impact on market efficiency in Europe as captured by electricity prices and 
which factors matter most. So far, the literature on these aspects has produced inconclusive 
results. Country case studies do not allow deducing general patterns that may explain price 
differences among European countries. Simple cost comparisons between sources fall short of 
taking into account important macro-economic and country specific factors that also impact 
on the electricity price.  
The purpose of this thesis is to take advantage of the variety of electricity markets in Europe 
with different characteristics and use them to isolate on average effects of variables that may 
determine the electricity price. Unlike recent literature on RES-E technologies, the analysis is 
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extended by including other variables relevant for market efficiency. This allows pinpointing 
which are the main determinants of the electricity price in addition to technology choice. 
General patterns across Europe can thus be identified.  
This thesis is organized as follows: Section II covers the main insights from the quantitative 
literature that assesses the impact of RES-E deployment on market efficiency. Section III 
identifies the main factors of electricity markets and energy policy that impact on the price 
and covers its implications for market efficiency. Section IV presents the model and the theo-
retical reasoning for variables used. Section V analyses the data. Section VI provides model 
estimations and interpretation of the findings. Section VII concludes with an outlook for poli-
cy makers and future research.  
II) Literature review 
The empirical literature on the effects on electricity markets of RES-E is still relatively sparse. 
These studies also vary a lot in terms of scope, referring to the number of countries and 
sources examined, and methodology used. Methodologically, country case studies mostly use 
approaches to measure costs of one or more specific source types (Dale et al. 2004) and some-
times compare these costs with benefits specifically related to that source (de Miera et al. 
2008), (Frondel et al. 2010), (Kaldellis et al. 2005), (Stevanovic & Puca 2012). These anal-
yses aim at giving an indication as to which technologies may increase market efficiency. 
Other papers analyze effects of RES-E support polices by employing a model simulation for 
one energy market and observing equilibrium effects of those policies (Hindsberger et al., 
2003), (Unger & Ahlgren, 2007). Also, the interaction of RES-E support and pollution control 
policy, especially the ETS-market is discussed (Rathmann 2007). Econometric approaches 
have been used very scarcely (Moreno et al. 2012), (Groba, et al., 2011).  
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In terms of country scope, most empirical studies remain at a national level with some excep-
tions looking at a number of countries (Hindsberger et al., 2003), (Lipp, 2007), (Unger & 
Ahlgren, 2007), (Ragwitz et al., 2006). Only Moreno et al. (2012) looked at the effects of 
RES-E generation on electricity prices in the EU-27. Particularly striking is the fact that al-
most all studies focused entirely on either some particular renewable energy source or overall 
renewable energy production. Very few studies compared a renewable source with a fossil 
source and only so at the national level (Dale, et al., 2004). No study was found that compared 
various sources relevant for a country’s energy mix in terms of their different effects on mar-
ket efficiency. Some recent criticism has been that this research neglects other factors that 
should be considered when assessing electricity market efficiency, such as level of regulation, 
competition and market conditions (Traber & Kemfert, 2009) or macroeconomic conditions, 
country specific effects and international energy prices (Moreno et al., 2012).   
Summarizing, most studies that address the effects of a transition towards RES-E either do 
not take into account all relevant sources of electricity generation or do not consider effects 
that also determine market efficiency. However, this is important to understand to what de-
gree the energy transition towards RES-E actually matters for prices and in terms of market 
efficiency. Also, there is a need to extend research to include more countries so that general 
patterns in Europe can be identified.  
III) Brief characterization of electricity markets 
Please note that market efficiency in this chapter refers to the absence of market distortions. A 
certain impact of a variable on prices can indicate increases or decreases in distortions. Also, 
production can become more efficient by being able to offer the same quantity at a lower 
price due to cost decreases. 
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1) Relevant aspects of electricity markets affecting the price 
In general, electricity markets can be separated into a wholesale market and a retail market. 
On the first one, producers sell electricity to distributors while on the second, distributors sell 
to customers. In many cases, the two markets are not separated. Instead, a few or even one 
sole company dominates both markets. This is the case if vertical integration exists between 
supplier and distributor. Both concentration and vertical integration cause market distortions 
that may result in higher electricity prices. This gives rise to the importance of proper regula-
tion e.g. ensuring grid access for newcomers, proper separation of markets etc. Recent re-
forms have been undertaken across Europe in the 2000s (Erdogdu, 2011). Research on this 
issue has concluded that not simply liberalization but the quality of regulatory conditions and 
other country specific factors matter for reducing market distortions (ibid.). In the RES-E lit-
erature, only one study confirmed that reduced market concentration (implying increased 
competition) can do so (Moreno et al., 2012). However, more complex indicators for electrici-
ty market conditions exist that have not been used yet, leaving room for improvement 
(Conway & Nicoletti, 2006). General economic conditions such as GDP per capita and inter-
national resource prices should also be accounted for (Erdogdu, 2011) as they affect strongly 
the electricity price. 
On electricity markets, the supply curve, also known as the merit order, consists of the differ-
ent electricity sources’ marginal costs. Basically, the wholesale electricity price is determined 
by the marginal technology supplying the marginal demand. Since there are significant differ-
ences between marginal costs among technologies, the price may change significantly de-
pending on which technology serves the marginal demand. RES-E deployment may affect the 
merit order (de Miera et al., 2008). Wind, solar and biomass have comparatively low marginal 
costs, unlike thermal generation (coal and oil) or hydroelectric energy. If capacity of these 
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sources expands on a sufficiently large scale, the supply curve moves to the right and thus, 
ceteris paribus, may replace the marginal technology with a technology with lower marginal 
cost. This would effectively reduce the wholesale price. In that sense a price decrease would 
capture an improvement in market efficiency as the same supply can be offered at a lower 
price. Empirical studies analyzing this effect at a country level come to inconclusive results: 
Some find that the effect outweighs the cost of RES-E promotion (de Miera et al., 2008) 
(Sensfuß et al., 2008) (Rathmann, 2007) (Sensfuß, 2007), others find the opposite (Ragwitz et 
al., 2006), whereas some others cannot find proof of its existence (Sorrel, 2003).  
In addition to this, the average costs of production determine if more electricity generated by a 
certain source decreases or increases the price. Generation investment costs and network costs 
are particularly high for relatively new technologies. How these costs develop depends on the 
technology’s learning curve ratio, which is the price of electricity reduced e.g. per doubling of 
capacity. Again, empirical studies come to conflicting results with some finding a price de-
creasing effect of new technologies while others find the opposite (Dale et al., 2004), (Frondel 
et al., 2010), (Kaldellis et al., 2005) ,(de Miera et al., 2008). Another particularity is that the 
electricity sector receives high subsidies as governments seek to lower the electricity price or 
increase production by certain sources. This artificial increase of production makes it difficult 
to distinguish between price decreases related to a subsidization of a certain source and those 
related to lowering of production costs (efficiency gains). Disentangling these effects empiri-
cally is virtually impossible due to the lack of data for many countries (Kitson et al., 2011) 
(Badcock & Lenzen, 2010). 
The existence of an ETS-market and a price for carbon implies that these additional costs for 
generators and distributors can be passed to electricity prices thus increasing them (Moreno, et 
al. 2012). However, if RES-E substitutes electricity generation by fossil fuels, emissions will 
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be reduced, thus lowering the price of carbon and this may lower under certain circumstances 
the electricity price (Rathmann, 2007).
1
  
2) RES-E promotion and Feed-in-Tariffs 
Policies aimed at promoting RES-E can range from support in R&D to various forms of 
subsidies. FIT schemes are by far the most used and considered to be the most important 
RES-E support policy in Europe (Ragwitz et al., 2006), (Poputoaia & Fripp, 2008). FITs work 
as follows: “[…] renewable energy installations receive long-term contracts that guarantee 
access to the electricity grid at an elevated price. These contracts generally differentiate 
among renewable sources, offering higher incentives for more expensive technologies […]” 
(Fischer & Preonas, 2010: 5). Empirical literature on the effectiveness of FITs and its implica-
tions for market efficiency and the price is still relatively sparse. One stream of studies com-
pares different policy schemes adopted in several countries and their outcome in terms of 
RES-E capacity expansion (Lipp, 2007). Others compare the costs of the policy related to the 
subsidies with potential benefits of lowering the electricity price via effective RES-E promo-
tion (de Miera, et al., 2008). While some find a positive effect for single countries (de Miera, 
et al., 2008) (Traber & Kemfert, 2009), others find the opposite (Frondel et al., 2010).  
The essence of these results is that a FIT policy can be considered effective if it promotes 
strong RES-E growth without leading to too big market distortions. In terms of market effi-
ciency it could lead to inefficiencies if too costly projects are financed leading to higher elec-
tricity prices. On the other hand, it could lead to more efficiency if RES-E lower electricity 
prices by lowering marginal costs of the marginal technology in a given market (merit order 
                                                          
1
 Given that the reduction in the carbon price does not lead to a rebound in fossil production. 
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effect). Still, moderate price increases with substantial RES-E growth are often considered as 
an effective outcome (Mulder, 2008).  
When assessing the effectiveness of an FIT scheme, Traber & Kemfert (2009) point out that 
one should account for electricity market conditions (such as emission related or general regu-
lation or abuse of market power) as these determine the impact of the FIT. For instance, oli-
gopolies may lead to higher profit-cost margins for electricity providers meaning that they 
may still increase prices substantially referring to the higher costs of RES-E despite the cost 
coverage via the FIT.  
Ragwitz, et al. (2006) stress that administrative and market barriers (e.g. grid access) are 
crucial in determining the overall effect of an FIT scheme. Also, commitment and proper 
implementation of the policy scheme is necessary (Lipp, 2007), (Genius & Vergis, 2010), 
(Río, 2008) Hence, country specific policy design may play an important role for 
effectiveness. 
IV) The model 
The following 3 models contribute to the literature by analyzing what are the main determi-
nants of the household electricity price in Europe. With these models it can be addressed if 
RES-E (e.g. wind, hydro) increases the electricity price and if non-RES-E sources lower the 
price. This outcome was often expected in the literature reviewed. Also, it can be seen what 
kind of electricity market policies affect the price and how. A first intuition about possible 
results will be given in section V. In section VI the findings will be interpreted, also in relation 
to market efficiency.  
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1) Model specification 
Model 1: Effect of RES-E on household electricity price 
                                                        
  
 
        
Model 2: Effect of single production sources on household electricity price 
                                                            
  
 
                                             
Model 3: Effect of electricity market policies on household electricity price 
                                                                
where i = 1,…29 (country), t = 1991,…,2007 (model 1 and 2), t = 2004,…,2007 (model 1) 
and t = 2001,…,2007 (model 3).   refers to country effects to take into account any possible 
country specific effects that may determine the price beyond the variables included. Ln indi-
cates the logged form of a variable (applied to variables of quantities to observe the elasticity).    
In model 1 and 2, variables for RES-E and single electricity sources are included. The coeffi-
cients include the total effect of possible merit-order effects, production costs and the effect of 
subsidies for each individual source. These factors determine whether an increase in produc-
tion leads to a decrease or increase in prices.  
Model 1 aims to look at the overall effect of RES-E on the electricity price. This is based on 
the work of Moreno et al. (2012). Different to their work, the analysis will be done for two 
time periods instead of one: 1991-2007 and a shorter period 2004-2007. The 2000s represent 
a period with high RES-E growth and policy support, whereas the 1990s do not (see also 
10 
 
section V). The impact of high RES-E growth on the electricity market can be analysed by 
comparing the two periods. A change from a negative coefficient to a positive coefficient may 
be due to an increase in production costs caused by the RES-E growth. For instance, 
construction costs may increase as demand for input factors for plant construction increases. 
The change of the direction of the coefficient may also indicate less efficiency if even 
comparatively bad investment projects receive funding due to the subsidies. The variable 
Competition will be compared with Regulation (Model 2 and 3) which has not been used in 
such a regression to see which is the best to capture market conditions. 
Model 2 will look at which sources of electricity have a price decreasing or increasing effect 
for the time span of 1991-2007. This allows to compare single RES-E and non RES-E 
sources separately. The significance and magnitude of the RESE-variable’s coefficient in 
model 1 reflects the effects of each renewable source. This may lead to misinterpretations. 
Renewable sources contained in RESE may be counteracting and neutralizing themselves. 
For instance, positive (price-increasing) effects of one variable and negative (price-
decreasing) effects of another may lead to a small magnitude for the coefficient of overall 
RESE, suggesting that renewable sources do barely influence the price. This improves inter-
pretation of model 1.  
Model 3 looks exclusively at policy variables. The idea is to take into account that major re-
forms of the electricity sector such as the improvement of market conditions and the introduc-
tion of renewable energy support schemes broadly started across Europe at the beginning of 
the 2000s. Therefore, restricting the time period to 2001-2007 allows looking at these effects. 
Model 3 will thus give an indication on if FITs and regulatory reforms are related with higher 
or lower prices. Production variables were not plugged as this would cause problems observ-
ing the full effects of FIT and plugging too many variables would destabilize a model for such 
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a short time horizon. It will also be checked if country specific effects influence the signifi-
cance of FIT and Regulation as proposed by Groba et al. (2011). This would imply that 
country specific policy design, implementation and other conditions matter for policy 
effectiveness (ibid.). 
Certain control variables were plugged for all three models because they may contribute 
strongly to explaining the electricity price as was suggested by the literature, namely Green-
house Gases, Energy Dependency, GDP per capita. I will also be examined to what degree 
country specific conditions explain electricity prices. 
2) Theoretical Determinants of Electricity Prices 
For the logged production variables, the sign of its coefficients can be interpreted in two ways. 
1) A one percentage increase in supply decreases the price by a certain percentage. This im-
plies that the supply expansion all else (market conditions, demand, other supply quantities 
etc.) constant lowers the price of electricity of the particular source. If the source is used for 
electricity production on a sufficiently high scale, this influences the overall price, since the 
overall price of household electricity is a compounded price of the individual prices of elec-
tricity produced by source. If the particular source is relatively cheap in production meaning 
that the individual price is below the total price, the overall household electricity price will be 
lowered. 2) For a positive relation this works vice versa. Note that the price adaption process 
depicted here is affected by market distortions typical for electricity markets (market failure, 
externalities etc.). For instance, prices may not decrease because of a monopoly. Controlling 
for these special conditions ensures that such an interpretation is possible despite that. A nega-
tive coefficient for a RES-E source will mean that the price lowering effects (cost advantages, 
merit-order effects, cost reductions by subsidies) dominate the potential price increasing ef-
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fects (cost disadvantages). In the case of a positive coefficient this is vice versa. For a non-
RES-E source a negative coefficient again implies the dominance of price lowering effects 
over the potentially price increasing effects.  
lnED % change in “Energy Dependence” price index. A compounded annual price of interna-
tional gas and oil price averages was constructed using the most relevant price data for Eu-
rope: Dated Brent for oil and the Russian natural gas border price in Germany. Note that this 
is a time series variable equal for all countries. As Europe is considered to be energy depend-
ent, an increase in ED index is expected to increase the electricity price. 
lnGDP: % change of GDP per capita. When the general economic activity expands, demand 
increases and one can expect a positive effect on prices. 
lnGHG: % change of greenhouse gases (GHG) emitted by the electricity industry. This varia-
ble should capture the price effect of regulation on all GHG polluting sources (Gas and Com-
bustibles). The sign of the coefficient depends on the strictness of regulation. Consider two 
scenarios: 1) If a country contaminates relatively more ceteris paribus (production being con-
stant and not increasing) than another country, it is because regulation is relatively less strict. 
This means less costs are imposed on production and it can be produced cheaper. If this is the 
case for most countries, one can expect a negative coefficient. The more GHG emitted, the 
lower additional regulatory costs imposed and the lower the electricity price.
2
 2) Vice versa, if 
most countries oblige producers to comply with standards such as installing filters or making 
payments, costs increase, which is captured by a decrease in GHG. In case of strong regula-
tion one can expect a positive coefficient. The more GHG emitted, the higher the electricity 
price. Data on greenhouse gas pollution is by far the most comprehensive data in terms of 
                                                          
2
 Under this scenario the price of polluting sources such as coal is not increased due to the absence of 
internalization, making it more viable to use coal as a potentially cheaper source. Hence, lnGHG also 
captures part of the effect of production of these sources on the price. 
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years and countries that can serve as a proxy for regulation of energy industry related pollu-
tion. Data on Carbon Market Prices is too recent since the European Emission Trading 
Scheme (ETS) only started in 2005.  
Competition: Measures the market share of the biggest provider of electricity in the given 
national market and thus gives an indicator of market concentration. Rather concentrated 
markets can indicate abuse of market power and thus comparatively higher prices. Effects of 
policies aimed at liberalization of electricity markets can be captured by this variable, as liber-
alization tends to go along with less market concentration. Data was only available for 1999 
on.  
Regulation: Indicator of regulatory conditions for the electricity sector. This is a sector specif-
ic indicator as proposed by Conway & Nicoletti (2006). It has a range from 0.0 to 6.0 whereas 
a 6 represents bad regulatory conditions, a 0 represents optimal conditions according to eco-
nomic theory. Conway & Nicoletti checked for the existence of conditions that aim at tackling 
the sector specific problems leading to potential welfare loss. It checks for entry possibilities 
for new comers (grid access, liberalized wholesale market, consumer ability to choose among 
providers), public ownership and vertical integration between generation and transmission 
segments. Compared to Competition, this is a far more comprehensive indicator for market 
conditions and quality of regulation policy. One can expect that the higher the index, the 
higher the electricity price due to market distortions. This implies that the more regulation and 
or market conditions resemble an efficient electricity market, the lower the price. Hence a 
price decrease can be related to higher market efficiency. 
FIT: Dummy variable with the existence of a Feed-in-Tariff policy being = 1. Two channels 
were identified through which a FIT can affect the electricity price a) FITs may increase costs 
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if the promoted renewable sources are more costly than their counterparts and thus increase 
the final price. b) A large scale expansion of renewable sources can have a Merit-Order effect, 
thus decreasing the final price. Note that a) and b) are not captured by FIT if one controls for 
renewable production. Hence, a strong price increase through the existence of a FIT may in-
dicate a decrease in market efficiency. According to the literature a moderate increase or de-
crease would indicate a effective policy. Data was constructed by using information provided 
by REN21. The implementation of a FIT scheme in a certain year was plugged as a 1 for this 
year and subsequent years unless the scheme was stopped. More detailed data on exact quan-
tities of FIT or on other policies such as Renewable Portfolio Standards was discarded due to 
the lack of comprehensive data for European countries. 
V) Data Analysis 
1) Descriptive Analysis of Data 
Data on electricity production, prices, emissions and general economic activity were retrieved 
from Eurostat. International gas and oil prices were obtained from the IMF. Data on Feed-in-
Tariffs was obtained from the Renewable Energy Policy Network and on the electricity sector 
regulation from the OECD. All data is given per year and per country. Overall, the data set 
comprises 29 countries (see Annex) over the period 1991-2007 or 17 years. Based on bi-
annual data, annual average electricity prices (excluding taxes) for households with an aver-
age yearly consumption of 3500 kWh was constructed.  Of all available bandwidths it is the 
closest to the EU country average consumption.  
A descriptive analysis of price data can give already an understanding of what patterns and 
factors may influence European price levels and growth rates (see Annex II). Overall, national 
prices show very similar patterns as most of them decrease slightly until 2000 and then pick 
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up. In terms of levels, prices vary a lot among European countries. Whereas Italy’s electricity 
price has varied between 0.19 and 0.14 € per kWh with an average of 0.16 €, Greece’s has 
merely fluctuated between 0.06 € and 0.07€ with an average of 0.06€. Most national prices 
were between the range 0.06€ and 0.014€ per kWh, which emphasizes the quite strong differ-
ences regarding levels. This is reflected by the standard deviation of 0.03 with an average and 
median of 0.09. These findings stress that there may be two types of factors explaining differ-
ences in prices. First, most countries have maintained their price levels through most of the 
period with some growth in the last years. This may indicate that there are factors that impact 
on countries in a similar way explaining the same growth patterns. Also, with some excep-
tions, the ranking in price levels between countries has not changed a lot. Hence, there may be 
factors explaining different price levels that either did not change significantly over time or 
are constant over time. Second, the strong growth in prices in some countries (compared to 
the more moderate growth or stable prices in other countries) can be explained by time vary-
ing factors.  
Regarding production data, the most notable development is the strong growth of new tech-
nologies such as wind, solar, biomass and gas that takes place particularly in the beginning of 
the 2000s. Biomass, solar and nuclear energy are excluded from the analysis due to a lack of 
observations. International resource prices have been relatively stable throughout the 1990s, 
but increased significantly in the 2000s. Whereas in the beginning of the 1990s, Feed-in-
tariffs were only implemented in 5 countries, this number increased to 21 until 2007. In the 
1990s, regulatory conditions of electricity markets in the 1990s were far from optimal, possi-
bly heavily distorting markets, as given by our indicator for regulatory conditions. This situa-
tion improved in the 2000s.  
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2) Tests for Panel Data 
As descriptive analysis has shown, country specific effects that are constant over time may 
influence the electricity price significantly and thus should be controlled for to avoid unob-
served heterogeneity and biased estimators. A Hausman test was run for each model to check 
whether a random or fixed effects model was the best specification. For all models, H0 could 
be rejected (see Annex) confirming the presence of time fixed country specific effects. There-
fore, fixed effects models were chosen. F-Tests for each model confirmed the significance at 
the 1% level of the fixed effects in ai. Hence, the models were correctly specified. Since panel 
data always also has a time series dimension, problems related to this type of data may arise. 
Seasonality will not be an issue as the data is yearly. All variables were checked for following 
a unit root process. The presence of a unit root in one or more of the variables may cause spu-
rious regression results, so testing and correcting for this is vital to obtain robust results. This 
is something that has been neglected in previous panel data analyses (Moreno et al., 2012). 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were computed accounting for a trend where necessary (see 
Annex). For all three models, non-stationarity is not a problem. All regressions were corrected 
for heteroskedasticity by using robust standard errors. Testing for time-fixed effects gave that 
including time dummies is not necessary. Tests for serial correlation and cross sectional de-
pendence were not necessary since the panel features less than 30 years of observations 
(Baltagi, 2008). Due to a recent change in methodology in 2007, data for electricity prices 
beyond that year could not be used. However, this restricts the analysis only by 2 years (2008, 
2009) that are published with the new methodology.  
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VI) Results & interpretation 
Model 1 - Effect of RES-E on household electricity price 
Panel regression results for 1991-2007 gave the overall model a high significance at the 1% 
level (see output table in annex). However, lnRESE and lnGHG closely failed to be signifi-
cant at the 10% level. Competition and the Energy Dependency were also not significant. 
Only lnGDPpc proved to be highly significant at the 1% level. Overall, the model’s explana-
tory power is rather mediocre with an R² of 45%. The model was then adjusted, in order to 
capture effects from the beginning of the 2000s. Significance levels and overall explanatory 
power improve. LnRESE becomes significant from 2001 on, Energy Dependency from 2002, 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 2003 and Competition from 2004 on. The final model cap-
turing effects from 2004 to 2007 has a good explanatory power with an R² of around 67% and 
an overall significance at the 1% level as given by the F-Test results. lnGHG and lnRESE and 
time-constant fixed effects are very significant at the 1% level whereas lnGDPpc and lnED 
are so at the 5% and Competition at the 10% level. With respect to partial elasticities, logged 
GDP per capita has the highest impact on electricity price. A 1% increase in GDP per capita 
leads to an increase of the household electricity price of 0.26 %, ceteris paribus, and on aver-
age. A 1% increase in greenhouse gas emissions emitted by the electricity production sector 
increases the price by around 0.17% and a 1% increase in the energy dependence price index 
leads to a price increase of around 0.11% on average and ceteris paribus. Logged RESE and 
Competition have a lesser magnitude inducing only a price rise of 0.07% and a price decrease 
of 0.002%, respectively on average ceteris paribus. Fixed country specific effects have a 
strong impact, although the exact magnitude cannot be interpreted by construction of the 
model. It can be confirmed that an increase in RESE increases significantly the price. The 
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same is the case for GDP per capita and Energy Dependency. GHG emissions have a strongly 
positive impact. 
Model 2 - Effect of electricity sources on household electricity price 
Panel regression results gave model 2 overall a high significance at the 1% level and a good 
explanatory power with an R² of 64%. Like in model 1, GDP per capita, Energy Dependency, 
the variable for market conditions, and the fixed effects are all significant with similar magni-
tudes. Regarding the different production variables by source, lnHydro and lnGas are signifi-
cant at the 1% level and lnWind at the 5% level. lnCombustibles is only significant for pro-
duction capacities above 10.000 GWh and if lnGHG is omitted.
3
 All of them show a negative 
coefficient, thus lowering the price. Again, lnGHG is significant at the 5% level, but unlike in 
model one, the coefficient is strongly negative. A 1% increase in generation from combusti-
bles decreases the electricity price by 0.16% on average and ceteris paribus. Hydroelectric 
generation does so by 0.15%, natural gas by 0.05% and electricity generated by wind by 
0.03%. Contrary to results from model one, a 1% increase of GHG emissions decreases the 
price by 0.31%. 
Model 3 - Effect of electricity market policies on household electricity price 
Model 3 is also overall highly significant at the 1% level and exhibits a good explanatory 
power with an R² of 67%. Again, logged GDP per capita and the fixed country specific effects 
are significant at the 1% level.  Unlike in model 1 and 2, lnGHG and lnED are not significant. 
Regarding lnGHG, this can be attributed to the fact that the coefficient of lnGHG changes 
over time. While it is negative for the whole period, it is positive from 2004 on (see model 1). 
This change occurs in the years before 2004, which is why the coefficient becomes insignifi-
                                                          
3
 lnGHG captures here those effects were pollution (use of polluting sources like coal) is related to a price 
decrease. 
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cant. Hence, results for lnGHG in model 1 and 2 are still valid. Regarding lnED, the variable 
may be affected by the relatively short time period for model 3. Due to the short time horizon, 
effects of ED may become part of the fixed effects constant  . Since it is just a time series 
variable that is equal for all countries, observations may be too few to give a stable estimate. 
FIT and Regulation both have a positive effect on electricity prices that is significant at the 
10% level. For the period of 2001-2007, the existence of a FIT scheme does increase the 
household electricity price by 0.9% as compared to having no FIT in place on average, ceteris 
paribus. Also, a one point increase in the regulatory index, meaning a worsening of market 
conditions, leads to a price increase by 2.7%.  
Interpretation of results in the context of EU RES-E policy 
Please note that when references are made to how a variable influences the prices and may 
impact on market efficiency, that the effects captured in the model can materialize or not, 
depending on the final general equilibrium result in a real market.  
According to the panel regression results run in model 1, increasing RES-E does seem to in-
crease prices for 2004-2007. The price increases starting in 2000 clearly coincide with that 
(see descriptive part) and may be to some degree caused by the expansion in renewable gen-
eration. This can be attributed to the expansion of RES-E in the 2000s. However, results of 
model 1 for 1991-2007 indicate no such effect was significant. In fact, results from model 2 
show that for 1991-2007 all single electricity sources did not increase but decrease prices.  
This underlines that there may have been a shift in the 2000s when RES-E expansion caused 
price increases to a certain degree. High subsidy levels that fueled an increase in RES-E gen-
eration capacity in the 2000s may explain this. The sudden expansion in scale of RES-E may 
have lead to increases in production input prices (for plant construction), increasing produc-
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tion costs. Also, in the short run, average costs tend to be higher for new plant investments 
(Varian, 2007).
4
 This may explain that for the short period of 2004-2007 more costly produc-
tion made prices increase.  
Also, subsidies may have not been efficient in selecting projects or may have been so high 
that investments with too high costs involved were made. Moreover, electricity companies 
may have kept the income from subsidies without passing lower costs to consumers. Another 
aspect may be the type of technology that received more investment. Note that e.g. solar pow-
er increased in the 2000s.  
Model 3 results show that Feed-in-Tariffs have a price increasing effect so this particular poli-
cy seems to be related with the effect of RES-E on the price and the possible inefficiencies 
associated with that. RES-E funded by FIT seems to exercise a price increasing effect. Costs 
related with supported RES-E production seem to outweigh a possible merit-order effect. As 
expected from theory, sound regulation and addressing of market distortions (as captured by 
Regulation) decrease prices and thus seem to increase market efficiency stressing the im-
portance of electricity market reforms. Despite that, one can see that the magnitude of impact 
of a FIT scheme only translates into a modest price increase of 0.9%. This highlights the im-
portance for future studies to investigate how the quality of FIT implementation changes this 
as suggested by Lipp (2007).  
Policies aimed at improving the regulatory environment though seem to be more promising to 
increase market efficiency. Moving from relatively bad market conditions (6 on the index) to 
very good conditions (0 on the index) would imply a decrease in the household electricity 
                                                          
4
 According to theory, every amount of electricity output has its ideal number or size of plants (where 
average costs are lowest). However, if output increases, a company cannot adapt that rapidly  by building 
more plants. Its average costs increases. In the long run, it can adapt its plant portfolio to the optimal size, 
so that average costs are lower. 
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price by 16.2%. Some countries have shown that these large scale reforms are possible. Po-
land for instance brought down its indicator from 6.0 to 2.2 within 10 years. The comparison 
between model 1 and 3 shows that these factors matter far more than market concentration: 
Competition has very little impact on the electricity price. Even a decrease of 50% of the big-
gest provider’s market share would decrease price on average and ceteris paribus only by 
0.085%. 
The high significance and strong impact of GHG emissions in model 1 indicates that in the 
analyzed period of 2004-2007, internalization of external effects is working in a sense emis-
sions are related to additional expenditures (abatement measures or payment for emission 
certificates) that lead to a higher price. This can be accounted to the implementation of the 
ETS in 2005 and a priced in anticipation of this process by producers in 2004. Contrary to 
results from model 1, GHG emissions have a strong negative effect on the electricity price in 
model 2. Apparently, for the whole period from 1991-2007, GHG related regulation was rela-
tively weak across Europe. Since little cost were imposed on electricity generation related to 
GHG pollution, higher GHG emissions imply lower additional costs, leading ceteris paribus 
to lower prices. This changed with the emergence of stronger regulation, such as the ETS. 
Lastly, as suggested already by the descriptive analysis, country fixed effects play a substan-
tial role in determining the electricity price. These structural aspects can explain the consistent 
difference in price levels among European countries. They may also limit a country’s ability 
to make use of comparatively cheaper electricity sources due to preferences, historical reasons 
or geography disabling the use or access to certain sources. For all three policy variables 
(lnGHG, Regulation, FIT), not controlling for fixed effects biased the results making the coef-
ficients insignificant. Thus, all the policy variables depend on country specific effects, so poli-
cy design, implementation and commitment seem to play an important role. 
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VII) Conclusion 
The use of a panel data econometric approach for 29 European countries sheds new light on 
the debate of efficiency of RES-E. The thesis finds that electricity generated from combus-
tible sources, natural gas, hydro and wind for the time span of 1991-2007 had a price lowering 
effect (for each single source ceteris paribus, on average). In contrast to that, for the time span 
of 2004-2007, RES-E had a price increasing effect. High subsidies fueled an increase in RES-
E capacity in the 2000s may explain this. Higher production costs may be due to higher short 
term average costs or increase in input prices. Also, subsidies may have not been efficient in 
funding projects. Moreover, electricity companies may have kept the income from subsidies 
without passing lower costs to consumers. Future research should thus consider longer time 
series of data once available to see if price increases are rather a temporary effect caused by 
high short term costs of new plants or the product of inefficiencies. In order to capture ineffi-
ciencies, one could see if higher profit-cost margins of electricity providers are related with 
higher prices. This would indicate that price increases are related with companies making 
more profits through higher prices despite lower generation costs.   
Further analysis on policy variables shows that Feed-in-Tariffs have a price increasing effect. 
Sound regulation and addressing of market distortions decrease prices and thus seem to in-
crease market efficiency stressing the importance of electricity market reforms. Also, the ETS 
seems to contribute to market efficiency through internalization of externalities that increase 
electricity prices. Policy-makers should take into account that not the mere existence of a pol-
icy matters. The policy variables depend on country specific effects, so policy design, imple-
mentation and commitment seem to play an important role. Country specific characteristics 
are an important factor that determines prices. To study the impact of FITs’ impact on market 
efficiency future research should thus develop comprehensive measures of FIT quality.    
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VIII) Annex 
1) Data 
The 29 countries chosen for the analysis were the EU-27 as well as Norway and Croatia. The 
latter were selected for being strongly integrated in the EU’s electricity market. Other coun-
tries for which this applies had to be excluded due to a lack of data.  
2) Table 1: Output & tests 
 Model Specifications: 
 Model 1 – (1), (2); Model 2 – (3); Model 3 – (4) 
(Robust standard errors of coefficients are in parentheses) 
Unit root tests  
for each variable 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test  
(H0: all panels contain unit roots) 
lnHHPrice (dependent) 1991-2007 >2003 1991-2007 >2000 Reject H0*** for time > 1999 
lnRESE 
0.038 
(0.033) 
0.066*** 
(0.022) 
- - Reject H0*** 
Competition 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
- - Reject H0*** 
lnCombustibles - - 
-0.158* 
(0.087) 
        - Reject H0*** 
lnGas - - 
-0.045*** 
(0.009) 
- Reject H0*** 
lnHydro - - 
-0.151*** 
(0.041) 
- Reject H0*** 
lnWind - - 
-0.028** 
(0.012) 
- Reject H0*** 
Regulation - - 
0.008 
(0.141) 
0.027* 
(0.014) 
Reject H0*** 
FIT (dummy, 1= FIT in place) - - - 
0.090* 
(0.044) 
- 
lnED 
0.004  
(0.032) 
0.107** 
(0.042) 
0.087*** 
(0.020) 
0.028 
(0.022) 
Reject H0*** for time >2000 
lnGHG 
0.091 
(0.127) 
0.176*** 
(0.063) 
-0.311** 
(0.143) 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
Reject H0*** 
lnGDPpc 
0.525*** 
(0.114) 
0.265*** 
(0.117) 
0.611*** 
(0.073) 
0.668*** 
(0.106) 
Reject H0*** 
constant    (fixed effects) 
-8.788*** 
(1.775) 
-7.674*** 
(1.316) 
-3.567** 
(1.583) 
-9.066*** 
(0.959) 
- 
Observations 171 88 199 133 
 
R² 0.56 0.67 0.64 0.68 
F-Test for joint significance 
Reject 
H0*** 
Reject 
H0*** 
Reject 
H0*** 
Reject 
H0*** 
Hausman-Test FE FE FE FE 
Wald Test for heteroskedasticity 
(use robust SE if H0 rejected) 
Reject 
H0*** 
Reject 
H0*** 
Reject 
H0*** 
Reject 
H0*** 
Wald Test for time-fixed effects 
(H0: no time-fixed effects) 
Reject H0* 
(discarded) 
Reject H0* 
(discarded) 
Reject 
H0*** 
Accept H0 
Note: *(**,***) = significant at the 10% (5%, 1%) level 
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IX) Annex II 
Table 1: Stable electricity prices in 9 selected European countries (unit: 1€) 
 
Table 2: Volatile or strongly growing electricity prices in 8 selected European countries 
(unit: 1€) 
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Table 3: Energy dependency Index for Europe (equal for all countries)  
 
 
Table 4: EU-27 Electricity generation by fuel in % (2007) 
 
Table 5: EU-27 Electricity from RES-E in gross electricity production in % (2007) 
 
Source: European Commission. Market Observatory for Energy Report 2009 
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